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Abstract 
 
This paper develops an empirically-relevant framework (a) to examine whether or not the 
African business environment hinders or promotes the knowledge economy (KE), (b) to 
determine how the KE which emerges from such an environment affects economic growth, and 
(c) how growth in turn relates to  the ‘inclusive development’ of 53 African countries during the 
1996-2010 time period. The framework provides a modest guide to policymaking about, and 
further research into, such relationships. We implement the framework by building a three-stage 
model and rationalizing it as five interrelated hypotheses. To allow greater concentration on the 
issues that are themselves already complex, our model is very simple, but clear. For example, we 
make neither an attempt to evaluate causality nor to test for it, even though we suspect the links 
to be multi-directional – opportunity costs are everywhere. Instead we focus on fundamental 
relationships between the dynamics of starting business and doing business as expressed in the 
state of KE, and through it to the inclusive development via the economic growth of those 
countries. Estimation results indicate that the dynamics of starting and doing business explain 
strongly a large part of variations in KE. The link between KE and economic growth exists, but it 
is weak, and we provide plausible reasons for such a result. Despite the weak association 
between KE and economic growth, KE-influenced growth plays a very important role in 
inclusive development. In fact, growth of this kind has stronger effects on inclusive development 
and by implication on poverty reduction, than some of conventional controls in this study such as 
FDI, foreign aid, and even private investment. There is clearly room for further research to 
improve the results, but just as clearly practical policy is best served by not neglecting the 
relationships examined in this paper.  
 
JEL Code: L59; O10; O30; O20; O55 
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1. Introduction 
 
The objective of this paper is three-fold: (a) to examine whether or not the African business 
environment hinders or promotes the knowledge economy (KE), (b) to determine how the KE 
which emerges from such an environment affects economic growth, and (c) how growth in turn 
relates to  the ‘inclusive development’ of 53 African countries during the 1996-2010 time period. 
By the national business environment we mean conditions surrounding starting business and 
doing business. More specifically, we refer to such conditions as business dynamics, and they 
include: (a) dynamics of starting business, and (b) dynamics of doing (operating) business. Even 
though we will be talking only of “doing business”, technically the dynamics of doing business 
include (i) trade, (ii) technology exports and/or imports, (iii) property rights and, (iv) closing 
business
1
.  
  
The examination is important for a number of reasons including the following four. First, at the 
microeconomic level business dynamics influence the value of the firm, and in a world 
increasingly driven by technologies of all sort, the value of the firm affects the long-term 
development, sustainability, and performance of the KE (Ernst & Young, 2013; Leke et al., 
2010; Anyanwu et al., 2012; Kuada, 2009).  This first contribution is in line with the Sustainable 
Development Goals (UN, 2013, pp. 7-13).  
 
Second, the performance of KE ultimately affects the competitiveness of nations, which in turn 
has measurable implications for economic growth and inclusive development. We deliberately 
utilize the notion of inclusive development to suggest that our analysis goes beyond assessing the 
growth-development nexus of the conventional variety to inclusive development, because 
‘output may be growing, and yet the mass of the people may be becoming poorer’ (Lewis, 1955, 
emphasis added). This Lewisian thesis has been recently rediscovered by Piketty’s (2014) 
‘Capital in the 21st Century’ in developed countries along with a growing stream of literature on 
developing nations (Kalwij & Verschoor, 2007; Thorbecke, 2013; Fosu, 2009, 2014; Singh, 
2014). 
 
                                                 
1
 These business dynamics are not affected by multicollinearity and overparameterization issues. Hence, unlike the 
KE indicators, there is no need to construct indices in order to avoid redundancy of information. The correlation 
analysis can be provided upon request. Moreover, Tchamyou (2014a) and Tchamyou (2014b) have used them 
distinctly as dependent and independent variables respectively.  
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Third, there is continued effort aimed at enhancing understanding of the factors and forces 
determining the KE in African countries to which this paper seeks to contribute. The contribution 
extends recent African literature on institutional determinants of innovation (Oluwatobi et al., 
2014), business research (Sigue, 2011), and entrepreneurship (Brixiova et al., 2015) needed for 
the continent to emerge from poverty (Kuada, 2011). Studies closest to the current exposition in 
the literature include Tchamyou (2014ab). Tchamyou (2014a) has investigated the role of KE in 
African business while Tchamyou (2014b) has assessed the reverse relationship, i.e., the impact 
of entrepreneurship on KE in Africa. The latter study informs the first-stage of empirical analysis 
of the current study. We build on it by incorporating economic growth in the second stage, and 
inclusive human development in the third stage. While business dynamics might obviously 
influence KE, we go two steps further in investigating how the nexuses are growth-enhancing on 
the one hand, and on the other hand, how ‘the positive externalities of the growth-enhancing KE 
from business dynamics’ might seep through onto inclusive development.  
 
Finally, and as far as we know, extant theoretical and empirical work ignores, and/or pays 
insufficient attention to, the essential links between African business dynamics, KE, economic 
growth, and inclusive development.  
 
We approach the issues in a stylized three-stage fashion (model) in which business dynamics 
affect KE, KE affects economic growth, and growth affects inclusive development. The model is 
estimated and tested as five interrelated hypotheses. In doing so we find that starting and doing 
business do indeed explain a large part of variations in KE observed in African countries, and 
that KE has affected growth, and through growth inclusive development. The magnitudes of the 
effects are low at all three stages, but they are reasonably signed and statistically and/or 
economically significant. We conclude that the three stages are critical to the future progress of 
African countries, and call policy and further research attention to them.  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature, and is 
followed by the methodology in Section 3. Section 4 presents the empirical results, while Section 
5 discusses the concluding economic implications of results for policy and further research. 
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2. Literature 
 
This section is divided into four sub-sections, each with a specific theme that forms the basis for 
the structure of the hypotheses and the estimation technique deployed in subsequent parts of the 
paper. While stylized, the approach is simple, clear, and easy both to implement and follow. 
 
2.1 Business Dynamics and Business Performance 
 
The general literature on the effects of the business environment (climate) on the performance of 
firms is huge and very old. Michael E. Porter (1990, 1998) traces the literature back to Adam 
Smith’s concepts of division of labor, comparative advantage, and specialization across 
economies as illustrated by the example of the safety pin factory (Smith, 1937[1776], cf. Stigler, 
1957).
2
 Influenced by Smith regional economists (like Krugman) and other regional scientists 
(mainly economic geographers) have long insisted that the optimal location of an economic 
activity is a function of the basic business costs as well as location-specific costs (Richardson, 
1969). The determinants of such costs (and benefits) include the availability of primary factors of 
production (land, labor, capital, and entrepreneurship), availability of, and accessibility to, local 
and global product and money markets, availability of good transport and physical infrastructure 
systems, and opportunities for agglomeration and other external economies made possible by the 
availability of amenities like libraries, schools/colleges/universities, social networks, and so on. 
Porter (1998) has depicted all these in a simple but clarifying diagram with four interactive 
vortexes, representing the “firm strategy, structure, and rivalry” in one vortex, “related and 
supporting industries” in the second vortex, the “factor conditions” (supply) in the third vortex, 
and in the fourth vortex “demand conditions” – all subject to random chance and non-random 
government policy (see Porter’s Figure 1, 1990, p. 127, or 1998, p. 9). David Neven and 
Cornelia Droge (2001) have dubbed Porter’s scheme the “Porter’s diamond model.” 
 
Despite Porter’s brilliant effort, the general theory of the business climate is a lot more complex 
than the optimal location theory of the firm (business). Experts know from observations that 
businesses do not always set up in their lowest cost and/or highest profit locations. However, old 
                                                 
2
 We assume that the economist reader already knows that the concept of comparative advantage is due David 
Ricardo as a correction to Adam Smith’s mistaken view that specialization required absolute advantage. Paul 
Krugman is an excellent guide on these matters and the interested reader can start with his Nobel Prize Lecture. 
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ideas hardly die; they only find new applications, and African countries are no exceptions to this 
rule. Let’s take a quick look. 
 
According to N’da (2012) the cost of doing business in Sub-Saharan African countries (SSACs), 
as assessed by the World Bank in its annual Doing Business reports, depends on nine main 
indicators of the quality of business environment. They are: the ease of setting up a business, 
obtaining construction permits, enforcing and transferring property rights, securing loans, 
protecting investors, paying taxes and fees, cross border trade and other transactions, fulfilling 
contractual obligations, and resolving insolvency, and other shut-down conditions. Together 
these indicators suggest further that the transparency of the business dynamics are important to 
trade and foreign direct investment (FDI), and hence to the KE. Furthermore, the recent co-
publication of the World Bank (WB) and the International Finance Corporation (IFC) on Doing 
Business in the East African Community (2013) revealed that only 10 SSACs rank among the top 
100 of 185 countries in which it is easy to do business. The next small group fall somewhere 
between 109 and 134 places, and the majority of SSACs rank below the 169
th
 place (cf. other 
regions http://www.doingbusiness.org). More importantly, while the report is recent, the issues it 
raises about the business environment are not new, at least not to the experts in the area. For 
example, Eifert, Gelb, and Ramachandan (2005) pulled together microeconomic and 
macroeconomic evidence on the competitiveness of African manufacturing sectors. They found 
that it is determined by the business climate, which affects the relative advantages and external 
economies of those sectors. They concluded that “Africa is high-cost relative to its income and 
productivity,” and they recommended reforming business attitudes and practices there. 
 
Spring, Rolfe, and Odera (2013) studied the SSA business environment by major regions. They 
found improving economic factors and forces including economic growth, trade, infrastructure, 
and FDI. Political dimensions of the business climate are a toss with some regions and countries 
being more unstable than others. Health, cultural and social aspects of the business dynamics 
remain somewhat negative. Consequently the authors surmised that the business environment 
remains challenging in SSACs where regulatory, contract enforcement, difficulty of starting 
business, and corruption are the highest hurdles. 
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Although the business environment and its effects on business activity have origins in standard 
economic theory, recent traditional economic literature on the topic is not as voluminous as the 
literature coming from business economists and economic journalists. A rare exception is that the 
Journal of African Economies devoted space in one of its 2001 issues to the African business 
environment with special reference to investment. Fosu, Mlambo, and Oshikoya led the 
discussion with an overview and they concluded that “despite more than a decade of reform in 
many African countries, investment and growth rates are still far below the levels required for 
sustainable development” (p.1). In particular, Mlambo and Oshikoya examined macroenomic 
factors and forces affecting investment in Africa and discovered that the business climate, 
represented by fiscal, financial and monetary policy, as well as macroeconomic uncertainty and 
trade-related issues have had enormous influence on private investment. They concluded that the 
political setting, more precisely political (in)stability as a proxy for the business climate, 
“matters for investment,” and external shocks  resulting from the volatility of the narrow export 
base and unfavorable terms of trade “have had a negative impact on private investment recovery” 
(ib.). 
 
Also in the same issue Jan W. Gunning and Taye Mengistae (2001) surveyed microeconomic 
evidence on manufacturing investment in Africa during the 1990s. They uncovered that the 
market processes have selected the survival of efficient firms in African countries as strongly as 
they did elsewhere, so that while macroeconomic literature show that low returns of investment 
in Africa explain poor economic growth there, microeconomic evidence suggest high returns. 
Thus, the low real rates of investment are more likely due to the politically risky business 
environment than anything else.  Devarajan, Easterly and Pack (2001) appear to disagree with 
Gunning and Mengistae’s assessment, because their cross-country data and micro data from 
Tanzania indicate that investment in Africa is not too low. In fact the low marginal impacts of 
investment on growth suggest too much, not too little, investment. 
 
Marcel Fafchamps’s (2001) very interesting and unique article focused on network and other 
externalities of business dynamics. He reasoned that network and external transaction costs have 
a tendency to lock market participants into inefficient and unequal long-term relationships. 
According to this perspective the effects of the African business environment may not be 
8 
 
particularly peculiar. We concur that a methodological approach like Fafchamps’s which does 
not seem to assume a negative business climate a priori is attractive to us as it allows for 
exceptions to the rule. Variations in the business environment across countries, regions and 
industries even within the same country clearly show that exceptions do exist. For instance, with 
respect to revenue in the mobile technologies sectors in Africa higher operators’ tariffs may be 
attributable to less than conducive business dynamics surrounding mobile technologies in Africa 
compared to other regions in the world. However, over the 2003-2008 years, measured by the 
Herfindahl index, African mobile markets have become more competitive than before and 
market penetration rate has increased. Consequently variable network cost/traffic minute for 14 
African mobile operators have fallen – implying considerable economies of scale along with 
network effects (Gutierrez, Lee and Virto, 2009; Gille, Noumba Um, Rudel, and Simon, 2002; 
Esselaar, Gilwald, and Stork, 2007; Gilwald and Stork, 2008). All these cannot be explained by a 
negative business climate, perhaps not even by a positive one alone. 
 
2.2 From Business Dynamics to KE 
 
A KE is a shortcut for a knowledge-based economy. According to the WB a KE has four pillars, 
and their corresponding indicators. Therefore any business environment that affects the creation, 
transfer, and spread of knowledge essentially affects the very foundation of the KE. Changes in 
any of the four pillars, or indicators, of the KE are changes in the KE itself, with all potential to 
lower, or raise countries’ performance and ranking on the knowledge economy index (KEI). 
Again as indicated in the introduction above, we are unaware of any study that specifically links 
business dynamics, or their indicators, to the KE. This study attempts to fill that gap in 
understanding. 
 
The attempt is not starting from scratch in the literal sense. It is commonsensical that since KE is 
a function of investment in the four pillars or their indicators, any business climate that interferes 
with the investment in the four pillars, also interferes with the KE. We know, for instance, from 
Erik Stan and Elizabeth Garnsey (2006) that knowledge facilitates entrepreneurship and the latter 
leads to knowledge growth which stimulates the KE in turn (cf. Tchanyou, 2014ab). Zakic, 
Jovanovic, and Stamatovic (2008) discuss nine external and internal factors that determine 
product and process innovations. The discussion concluded that “the companies in new 
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industries compete with the help of product innovations comparing with mature industries 
dominated by process innovations” (p. 26)3 
 
Even though there is no one-on-one mapping of the business dynamics to the KE, or its 
indicators, there are two studies relevant to this current effort. First, Andres, Asongu and 
Amavilah (2014) estimated the impact on KE in African and MENA countries of formal 
institutions through governance. They found that formal institutions are necessary, but not strong 
enough, determinants of KE. Second, Amavilah, Asongu, and Andres (2014) extended the 
previous study, by considering the effects on KE of globalization-related peace and stability 
acting through governance. It turned out that governance affects KE differently depending on the 
kind of globalization, the peace and stability it induces, and the type of governance through 
which it influences the KE. In general the peace and stability induced by trade-related 
globalization have stronger effects on governance, and hence on KE, than peace and stability 
resulting from FDI-related stability associated with globalization represented as financial flows.  
 
2.3 From KE to Economic Growth 
 
The importance of the relationship between the KE and the general economy depends on the 
intensity of the knowledge underlying the KE itself. At the early stages of progress KE acts like 
technology and each general economy has some KE just as it has some knowledge. Think of an 
x-dimensional plane with a tiny dot in it. As the economy grows, the dot (KE) also gets bigger 
and bigger. How big KE is at any point in time depends on the relative difference between the 
rates of growth of the KE and the general economy. If KE grows faster than the general 
economy, then KE essentially becomes a factor of production that encompasses human capital 
itself. In highly knowledge-intensive economies, KE and the general economy are the same 
things. Thus, the special nature of the KE is that it can be both an input and an output. 
 
Now, KE viewed as technology, changes in it would lead to changes in both production and 
consumption possibilities, depending on whether they affect the demand or supply side. 
Economists would recognize that sustained expansion of production possibilities is economic 
                                                 
3
 In the authors’ own words and order, the nine external and internal factors are: industry maturity; customer needs 
and expectations; demand; technological opportunities;  attractiveness for investments;  intensity of competition;  
company size; origin of ownership; and export orientation. 
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growth, and improvement in consumption possibilities is a sign of economic well-being, which 
when sustained makes for inclusive development. We return to the preceding statement in the 
next sub-section, and later. 
 
If KE is taken to be a factor of production, that is an index of a kind of aggregate human capital, 
then it would have institutional effects on other factors of production as well as on national 
innovation systems. This is the perspective implicit in Andres, Asongu, and Amavilah’s (2014) 
study on the impact of formal institutions on KE, which was recently extended by Amavilah, 
Asongu, and Andres’s (2014) examination  of the effects of globalization-induced peace and 
stability on KE via governance. The literature which guided both papers above is relevant to this 
one as well, and we strongly encourage the interested reader to go to that literature for further 
elucidation. Suffice to say that the literature illustrates clearly the importance of the links 
between the KE and the growth of the general economy. What we do in this paper is quantify 
that link in a way that acknowledges the surrounding business context – and that, as far as we 
know, has never been done for developing countries, and most certainly not for African 
countries.  
 
2.4 From Economic Growth to Economic Development 
 
 Economic growth improves production possibilities, but possibilities do not always mean equal 
benefits. A number of UN reports are full of recent examples of growth that is accompanied by 
inequality, poverty, or both. Indeed, inspired by Kuznets’s (1955, 1971) work, not long ago 
many development economists accepted an inverted-U relationship between inequality and 
growth as an unavoidable aspect of economic development. In the years 1990-2010 economic 
growth coincided with both inequality and poverty in SSACs, although both Alwyn Young 
(2012) and Maxim Pinkivskiy and Xavier Sala-i-Martin (2014) show that African countries on 
average have done well in terms of consumption growth and poverty reduction. Over the same 
time period OECD, MENA, and South Asian countries have seen inequality rise with some 
growth, while Latin American and South East Asian countries with high growth and inequality in 
the 1980-2000 time period, have experienced significant reductions in inequality along with slow 
growth. Perhaps J. Bhagwati (1958) was correct after all that there is such a thing as 
“immiserizing growth”. One may rhetorically ask whether or not there is also such thing as 
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“equalizing slow or no growth”. 
 
According to the UN, growth is inclusive if it (a) creates decent employment for all; (b) provides 
opportunities to all social segments of the economy; (c) promotes equality of money and non-
money gains from growth; (d) improves human capital (education, skills, health, longevity (life-
expectancy), mobility) for at least the poorest; and (e) makes attainable social justice, individual 
liberty, and other forms of freedom. Thus, inclusive growth contrasts with sustained growth 
which is simply the shifting out rightwards of the production possibilities due to changes in the 
technical capability of the economy resulting from technological change (productivity shift) 
and/or changes in the quantity or quality of resources or improvements in efficiency (free 
lunches). In fact, sustained growth plus inclusive growth is sustainable growth, which is the 
objective dimension of sustainable development. 
 
Kjoller-Hansen and Sperling (2013) quantify inclusive growth “by setting up five distinct criteria 
for inclusive growth in relation to productive employment”, and they used household data to 
evaluate the experiences of Albenia, Burkina Faso, Egypt, Romania, and Tajikistan. They found 
that countries’ experiences differed given their “timespan, history, income level, culture, political 
structure, religious orientation, etc.” (p. 10). For example, “more diversified economies at a 
higher income level seem to perform better against the five criteria of inclusive growth” (p. 15) – 
suggesting further that “… growth in GDP per capita is not enough for development to be 
inclusive, [and that] more moderate growth rates, coupled with structural changes, can be as 
inclusive as high growth rates without” (p. 15). This is consistent with our statements above. 
 
Finally, Ianchovichina and Lundstrom’s (2009) framework and its application to Zambia are 
both very well done and we rely on their paper to benchmark ours. Clearly growth is meaningful 
only if it reduces poverty and inequality, and if it does so in a sustained and sustainable manner. 
To be sustainable it has to be “broad-based.” To be sustained inclusive growth needs a viable 
technology and be able to remove micro- and macro-economic constraints imposed by business 
dynamics, and the conventional factors and forces of production.  In the case of Zambia the 
constraints included: (a) the employability of the poor themselves, (b) the cost of physical 
capital, (c) low social returns to natural resource endowments, (d) geography, (e) infrastructure, 
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(f) human capital, (g) government failures with respect to the macroeconomic environment and 
taxation, (h) governance, and (i) pure market failures due to public goods/services, common 
resources, externalities, and/or asymmetric information costs (uncertainty and risks). 
 
Both Ianchovichina and Lundstrom, and Kjoller-Hansen and Spirling provide practical formulas 
for characterizing income from employment of resources which individual persons or countries 
need to meet the requirement, the Euler or Keynes-Ramsey, conditions for inclusiveness which 
captures the welfare effects of inclusive growth.  
 
We use innovate around the Ianchovichina and Lundstrom (2009) insight to argue that since 
sustainable growth is sustained inclusive growth, it is a good enough proxy for inclusive 
development. This means that we take Sen’s (1983, 1999) definition of development as the 
capability that allows for freedom. In other words, the object of such development is national 
well-being. Thus, the human development index (HDI) is a better measure of well-being 
(standard of living) than per capita GDP (Sen, 1997, Anand and Sen, 1994). In addition, instead 
of focusing on the HDI, we rely on the inequality-adjusted human development index (IHDI). 
 
As described in various Human Development Reports (HDRs)  the IHDI accounts for HDI Less 
the “loss of human development due to inequality.” The larger the distance between the HDI and 
the IHDI, the greater inequality, and the coefficient of human development inequality measure 
the intensity of such inequality, i.e.,                           
        
   
    
    
   
  or the 
“loss in HDI due to inequality” (HDR, 2014, p. 4). Various HDRs reveal that SSACs have the 
highest IHDI in health, South Asia and the Arab States have the highest IHDI in education, while 
Latin American and the Caribbean have the highest IHDI in income. A more appropriate 
measure to use, but for which data is currently incomplete for SSACs, would be the poverty-
adjusted HDI, technically called the “multidimensional poverty index” (MPI). Thus, we 
understand that using IHDI is admission on our part that any statement we ultimately make about 
poverty reduction or increase is an inference from the assumption that inequality and poverty are 
positively correlated.  
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3. Methodology 
 
Our methodology has a number of stylized components. First, we describe the theoretical model 
we assume. Second, we construct testable hypotheses that would allow us to implement our 
model.  Third, we outline key variables of interest, and corresponding data and data sources, and 
subject the data to the principal component analysis to deal with the usual statistical problems. 
Finally, we characterize our estimation technique and put it to work. 
 
3.1 Model 
 
At the empirical level we solve the problem in parts for reasons discussed later. This section 
summarizes the relationships described above concisely. We begin the description with an 
assumption that all SSACs in our sample have two coexisting theoretical economies: the KE,    , 
and the general economy,    (cf. Lucas and Moll, 2013).    depends on micro- and macro-
economic determinants among them our business dynamics which we designate as    as well as 
controls (  ), where all countries are identified and the variables are time-indexed, but for 
simplicity country and time subscripts are ignored. Then 
 
      
        
                                                                                                                                      
 
Normalizing (1) by dividing through with some specific             we get 
 
                                                                                                                                   
 
where the lowercase letters are logarithmic data and uppercase are raw data.  
 
If we suppose that the link between (     ) and the general economy (     ) is either very weak 
or non-existent, so that the latter depends only on its own factors (  ) and forces (  ), then it 
would be determined as        
       However, we know that every economy has its own 
(     ), that the difference across economies is of the size and sophistication of (Y1, y1), not its 
existence. Hence, (     ) affects (     ) either as a productivity shifter (technological constant) 
acting through   , or as a factor of production and in that case it is an element of   . There is a 
lot and interesting things that can be done and said here, but for simplicity we let       , such 
that 
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To be able to associate    with growth, we divide (3) by either population to get per capita 
income (real GDP) or by labor to obtain per labor (worker) income (output). After taking the 
natural logs, (3) becomes, 
 
         
                                                                                                                      
   
which represents the growth equation and its Euler or Keynes-Ramsey conditions discussed in 
the papers we cite in the preceding section.  
 
Eqs. (3) and (4) put us right in the middle of the neoclassical growth debate, whether in its Solow 
(1956, 1957) and Swan (1956, 2002) exogenous version, or its new endogenous version 
according to Lucas (1988, 1993), Rome (1990), Aghion and Howitt (1992), Mankiw, Romer, and 
Weil (1992), Barro (1991), and many others. We welcome the debate, but resist the itch and 
temptation to pursue that route for now. Instead, we restate that the principal goal of all 
economic activities is to enhance human development in a sustainable way. We then accept 
Sen’s modified capabilities model that inequality, by implication poverty, adjusted human 
development index (IHDI) is a reasonable measure of the welfare effect of growth, that is, the 
national well-being or national standard of living. For this reason, let              , and note 
that as described and calculated in the Human Development Reports,    is determined by the (a) 
longevity and health of the population, measured by life-expectancy at birth, (b) the knowledge 
available to the economy, measured by education and training, and (c)  a “decent standard of 
living”, represented by per capita income. All three dimensions are adjusted by their respective 
inequalities.  
 
Put in a language familiar to growth economists, we designate the sum of the inequality adjusted 
longevity and health, and knowledge as human capital, H, i.e.,                    Then 
per capita H,  
 
    
      , and one can show, at least theoretically, that               
                     being the shares (weights) of    and    in   , such that 
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Taken together, it is clear that Equations 1 to 5 face the usual statistical culprits such as 
heteroskedasticity and multicollinearity, which in turn would compromise the technical 
efficiency of the estimates and thereby complicate their economic significance and relevance. To 
alleviate those problems we apply the principal component analysis to the relationships to 
minimize the risks posed by overparameterization and multiple correlations. First things, first. 
 
3.2 Testable Hypotheses 
 
We claim that in the first stage the dynamics of starting and doing business affect KE in African 
countries. In the second stage we propose that as determined by business dynamics, KE is 
important to economic growth in African countries. In other words, (i) growth from starting 
business is related KE, and (ii) growth from doing business related KE. The third-stage of the 
estimation process is the most critical one and it deals with the effect on inclusive development 
of growth-ehancing KE from business dynamics.
5
 Consequently, the entire estimation process 
reduces to the following fiver testable hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Education (Edutex) from starting and doing business is associated with growth 
which influences the quality of development (IHDI). 
 
Hypothesis 2: ICT from starting and doing business is associated with growth which influences 
the quality of inclusive development (IHDI). 
 
Hypothesis 3: Innovation (Innovx = STJA) from starting and doing business is associated with 
growth which influences the quality of development (IHDI). 
 
Hypothesis 4: Economic incentives (Creditex) from starting and doing business are associated 
                                                 
4
 Prior to 2010 Human Development Reports estimated 
   
 
 
 
 
 
                             
 
 
                   parts of human capital, and    
 
 
                       From 2010, components of the HDI were not longer equally weighted; they are 
computed as
 
3
321 ** HDI (see UNDP, HDR Technical Notes, 2014; Majerova, 2012), and adjusted the 
whole series. 
5
 We use the “quality of development” and “inclusive development” interchangeably. 
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with growth which influences the quality of development (IHDI). 
 
Hypothesis 5: Institutional regime (Instireg) from starting and doing business is associated with 
growth which influences the quality of development (IHDI). 
 
3.3 Variables and Data and Principal Component (PCA)  
 
In this part of the methodology we describe briefly key variables, their corresponding data and 
data sources. As often is the case in developing countries, available data is both limited and 
inaccurate. However, instead of filling in existing gaps with data from different sources, we 
chose to use World Bank (WDI) data primarily. Such a choice comes with a trade-off between 
consistency and small-size sample. 
 
3.3.1 Variables and Data 
 
Table 1 characterizes the variables of particular interest to this study. Panel A displays the five 
representations of KE. Panel B lists three indicators of what we refer to throughout this paper as 
‘business dynamics”, but our empirical focus is only on two – starting and doing business 
dynamics.
6
 Our primary interest is in how these dynamics affect KE in the African countries 
presented in Table 2, Panel B. Panel C of Table 1 outlines control and other variables. Most data 
used in this study are standard; they do not need special treatment. They allow us to extend the 
links the business dynamics and KE to economic growth and inclusive development. Last, but 
equally important, Table 2, Panel A, presents descriptive statistics. The definitions of variables 
are broadly consistent with Tchamyou (2014ab).  
 
Table 1: Variables: signs,  definitions, and data sources  
    
Variables Signs Variable definitions Sources 
    
Panel A: Dimensions in Knowledge Economy (KE) 
 
A1: Education 
    
Primary School Enrolment  PSE School enrolment, primary (% of gross) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Secondary School Enrolment  SSE School enrolment, secondary (% of gross) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Tertiary School Enrolment  TSE School enrolment, tertiary (% of gross) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Education in KE Educatex  First PC of PSE, SSE & TSE PCA 
                                                 
6
 Note again that doing business has three components: trade, technology, and property rights. 
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A2: Information & Infrastructure  
    
Internet  Users  Internet Internet users (per 100 people)  World Bank (WDI) 
    
Mobile Cellular Subscriptions  Mobile Mobile subscriptions (per 100 people) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Telephone lines Tel Telephone lines (per 100 people) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Information & Communication 
Technology (ICT) in KE 
ICTex First PC of Internet, Mobile & Tel PCA 
    
A3: Economic Incentive  & Institutional Regime  
    
Financial Activity (Credit) Pcrbof Private domestic credit from banks and 
other financial institutions  
World Bank (FDSD) 
    
Interest Rate Spreads IRS Lending rate minus deposit rate (%) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Economic Incentive in KE Creditex  First PC of Pcrbof and IRS PCA 
    
Corruption-Control  CC “Control of Corruption (estimate): 
Captures perceptions of the extent to 
which public power is exercised for private 
gain, including both petty and grand forms 
of corruption, as well as ‘capture’ of the 
state by elites and private interests”. 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
Rule of Law RL “Rule of Law (estimate): Captures 
perceptions of the extent to which agents 
have confidence in and abide by the rules 
of society and in particular the quality of 
contract enforcement, property rights, the 
police, the courts, as well as the likelihood 
of crime and violence”. 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
Regulation Quality  RQ “Regulation Quality (estimate): Measured 
as the ability of the government to 
formulate and implement sound policies 
and regulations that permit and promote 
private sector development”. 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
Political Stability/ No violence  PS “Political Stability/ No Violence 
(estimate): Measured as the perceptions of 
the likelihood that the government will be 
destabilized or overthrown by 
unconstitutional and violent means, 
including domestic violence and 
terrorism”. 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
Government Effectiveness  GE “Government Effectiveness (estimate): 
Measures the quality of public services, 
the quality and degree of independence 
from political pressures of the civil 
service, the quality of policy formulation 
and implementation, and the credibility of 
governments commitments to such 
policies”. 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
Voice & Accountability  VA “Voice and Accountability (estimate): 
Measures the extent to which a country’s 
citizens are able to participate in selecting 
their government and to enjoy freedom of 
World Bank (WDI) 
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expression, freedom of association, and a 
free media”. 
    
Institutional Regime in KE Instireg  First PC of CC, RL, RQ, PS, GE & VA PCA 
    
A4: Innovation  
    
Scientific & Technical Publications  STJA  Number of Scientific & Technical Journal 
Articles  
World Bank (WDI) 
    
Trademark Applications  Trademark  Total Trademark Applications World Bank (WDI) 
    
Patent Applications  Patent Total Residents + Nonresident Patent 
Applications  
World Bank (WDI) 
    
Innovation in KE  Innovex First PC of Trademarks and Patents  World Bank (WDI) 
    
    
Panel B: Business Indicators    
    
B1: Starting Business  
    
Time to Start-up  Timestart Log of Time required to start a business 
(days) 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
Cost of Start-up Coststart Log of Cost of business start-up 
procedures (% of GNI per capita) 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
New business density  Newbisden New business density (new registrations 
per 1,000 people ages 15-64) 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
Newly registered businesses  Newbisreg Log of New businesses registered 
(number) 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
    
    
B2: Doing Business  
    
B2a: Trade  
    
Cost of Export  Costexp. Log of Cost to export (US$ per container) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Trade Barriers  Tariff Tariff rate, applied, weighted mean, all 
products (%) 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
Trade Openness  Trade Export plus Import of Commodities (% of 
GDP) 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
    
B2b: Technology Exports  
    
ICT Goods Exports  ICTgoods: ICT goods exports (% of total goods 
exports) 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
ICT Service Exports ICTser ICT service exports (% of service exports, 
BoP) 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
High-Technology Exports  Hightecexp High-technology exports (% of 
manufactured exports) 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
    
B2c: Property Rights  
    
Contract Enforcement  Contenfor Log of Time required to enforce a contract 
(days) 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
Registration of Property  Regprop Log of Time required to register property 
(days) 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
 
Investor Protection  
 
Bisdiclos 
Business extent of disclosure index (0=less 
disclosure to 10=more disclosure). It 
measures the extent to which investors are 
 
World Bank (WDI) 
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protected through disclosure of ownership 
information  
    
    
B3: Closing Business  
    
Insolvency Resolution
7
   
Insolv 
Time to resolve insolvency (years). The 
number of years from the filling of 
insolvency in court until the resolution of 
distressed assets.  
 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
    
Panel C: Control & Other  Variables  
    
Inclusive Human Development   IHDI Inequality Adjusted Human Development 
Index  
World Bank (WDI) 
    
Economic Prosperity  GDPg GDP Growth Rate (annual %) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Foreign Aid  NODA  Net Official Development Assistance (% 
of GDP) 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
Inflation  Infl. Consumer Price Index (annual %) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Foreign Investment  FDI  Gross Foreign Direct Investment (% of 
GDP) 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
Public Investment  Pub Ivt.  Gross Public Investment (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Private Investment  Priv. Ivt. Gross Private Investment (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
    
WDI: World Bank Development Indicators.  GNI: Gross National Income. BoP: Balance of Payment. GDP: Gross Domestic Product. PC: Principal 
Component. PCA: Principal Component Analysis. Log: logarithm. Educatex is the first principal component of primary, secondary and tertiary school 
enrolments. ICTex: first principal component of mobile, telephone and internet subscriptions. Creditex: First PC of Private domestic credit and interest rate 
spread. P.C: Principal Component. VA: Voice & Accountability. RL: Rule of Law. R.Q: Regulation Quality. GE: Government Effectiveness. PS: Political 
Stability. CC: Control of Corruption. Instireg (Institutional regime): First PC of VA, PS, RQ, GE, RL & CC.   
 
Table 2: Summary statistics and presentation of countries  
       
 Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
  Mean S.D Min Max Obs. 
 
 
 
Knowledge 
Economy  
Educatex (Education) -0.075 1.329 -2.116 5.562 320 
ICTex (Information & Infrastructure) 0.008 1.480 -1.018 8.475 765 
Creditex (Economic Incentive) -0.083 0.893 -4.889 2.041 383 
Instireg (Institutional Regime) 0.105 2.075 -5.399 5.233 598 
Scientific and Technical Journal Articles(log)  1.235 0.906 -1.000 3.464 717 
Trademarks(log) 6.973 1.567 0.000 10.463 276 
Patentes(log) 5.161 2.077 1.386 9.026 121 
       
 
Starting 
Business    
Time to Start-up (log) 3.624 0.812 1.098 5.556 386 
Cost of Start-up (log) 4.354 1.312 0.741 8.760 386 
New business density  1.032 1.962 0.002 10.085 111 
Newly registered businesses (log) 7.965 1.878 2.639 11.084 111 
       
 
 
 
Doing 
Business  
Cost of Export (log) 7.282 0.517 6.137 8.683 305 
Trade Barriers (Tariff)  11.474 5.611 0.000 39.010 347 
Trade (log) 4.239 0.476 2.882 5.617 719 
ICT Goods Exports  0.788 1.979 0.000 20.944 391 
ICT Service Exports 6.098 5.792 0.017 45.265 277 
                                                 
7
Although the dynamics of closing business (Insolvency Resolution) would clearly affect KE, it is not included in 
empirical estimations, because issues in degrees of freedom.  
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 High-Technology Exports  4.640 7.192 0.000 83.640 455 
Contract Enforcement (log) 6.434 0.383 5.438 7.447 383 
Registration of Property (log) 4.175 0.756 2.197 5.983 346 
Investor Protection: Disclosure  4.774 1.976 0.000 8.000 293 
       
       
 
Control & 
Other 
variables  
Growth  4.763 7.293 -31.300 106.28 759 
Inclusive Human Development  1.351 6.341 0.127 47.486 551 
Net Official Development Assistance(NODA) 10.811 12.774 -0.251 148.30 704 
Inflation 57.556 955.55 -100.00 24411 673 
Trade  77.853 39.698 17.859 275.23 719 
Private Investment  12.979 9.400 -2.437 112.35 658 
Public Investment  7.449 4.500 0.000 39.984 655 
Foreign Direct Investment  4.221 8.451 -8.629 145.20 557 
       
Panel B: Presentation of Countries (53) 
Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Chad, Central African 
Republic, Comoros, Congo Democratic Republic, Congo Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial 
Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau,  Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, 
Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Rwanda, Sao Tomé & Principe, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, 
Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
       
S.D: Standard Deviation. Min: Minimum. Max: Maximum. Obs: Observations. 
 
 
3.3.2 KE Indicators and Principal Component Analysis (PCA) 
 
Even without formal diagnostics, it is clear from Table 1 that there are bound to be significant 
correlations among the indicators of KE, and between KE indications and business dynamics. 
Since Jolliffe’s (1986) seminal work, research has shown that the PCA can be utilized to reduce 
highly correlated variables into a smaller set of uncorrelated indicators called principal 
components (PCs) that retain a substantial portion of information in the initial dataset, see, e.g., 
Kaiser (1974;  Fomby, Hill, and Johnson, 1984; Jolliffe, 2002). The research recommends the 
retention of PCs with an eigenvalue that is greater than the mean, or greater than one. In the 
present case eigenvalues range from 1.31 for the Economic Incentive (Creditex) variable to as 
high as 4.64 for the Institutional Regime (Instireg) variable. We use logSTJA to proxy for 
Innovation (Innovex = logSTJA) because of limited degrees of freedom in the other components.
8
 
Again, the importance of eigenvalues is that they denote eigenvectors that have a significant 
proportion of the initial information or total variability. As Table 3 reveals the first PCs for 
education (Educatex), information and communication technology (ICTex), Innovex,Creditex, 
and Instireg correspond consistently to eigenvalues that are greater than one – meaning the 
                                                 
8
 logSTJA is the natural logaritnm of STJA, and STJA is Scientific & Technical Journal Articles. A number of 
studies have used the STJA to proxy for innovation in the KE literature (Chavula, 2010; Tchamyou, 2014ab).    
21 
 
vectors retain between 66% and 77% of overall information. 
 
 
Table 3: Principal Component Analysis (PCA) for KE Indicators 
KE dimensions Component Matrix (Loadings) First 
PC 
Eigen 
Value 
Indexes 
     
Education  School 
Enrolment  
PSE SSE TSE    
0.438 0.657 0.614 0.658 1.975 Educatex  
           
Information & 
Infrastructure 
ICTs  Internet Mobile Telephone    
0.614 0.584 0.531 0.730 2.190 ICTex 
           
Innovation 
System  
Innovation STJA Trademarks Patents     
0.567 0.572 0.592 0.917 2.753 Innovex 
           
Economic 
Incentive 
      & 
Institutional 
regime  
Economic 
Incentive  
Private Credit  Interest rate Spread    
-0.707 0.707 0.656 1.313  Creditex   
          
Institutional 
index 
VA PS RQ GE RL CC    
0.383 0.374 0.403 0.429 0.443 0.413 0.773 4.642 Instireg 
           
 
“P.C: Principal Component. PSE: Primary School Enrolment. SSE: Secondary School Enrolment. TSE: Tertiary School Enrolment. PC: Principal 
Component. ICTs: Information and Communication Technologies. Educatex is the first principal component of primary, secondary and tertiary 
school enrolments. ICTex: first principal component of mobile, telephone and internet subscriptions. STJA: Scientific and Technical Journal 
Articles. Innovex: first principal component of STJA, trademarks and patents (resident plus nonresident). VA: Voice & Accountability. RL: Rule 
of Law. R.Q: Regulation Quality. GE: Government Effectiveness. PS: Political Stability. CC: Control of Corruption. Instireg (Institutional 
regime): First PC of VA, PS, RQ, GE, RL & CC. Creditex: first principal component of private domestic credit and interest rate spread”.  
 
3.4 Estimation Technique  
 
We estimate the model in three stages we describe next below. 
 
Stage 1: KE in Africa, designated by (Y1, y1) depends on the dynamics of starting business 
(Table 1, Panel A), dynamics of doing business (Table 1, Panel B); globalization, governance, 
controls, and some random error.
9
 This first-stage builds upon Tchamyou’s (2014b) notion of 
‘the effect of entrepreneurship on KE’. It includes two sets of equations: KE from starting 
business, and KE from “doing business” (actually operating business). It is essentially Equations 
1 and 2. Hence,                          
 
Stage 2:  Economic growth (Y2, y2)  is a function of KE estimated in Stage 1, controls and other 
relevant variables, and random chances. This stage entails two sets of equations: Growth related 
to KE from starting business, and Growth emanating from doing business. This stage is anchored 
in Equations 3 and 4, implying       
                       
             
                                                 
9
Once more, note that the dynamics of doing business include trade dynamics  (Panel Ba), technological dynamics 
(Panel Bb), and dynamics of property rights (Panel Bc). The dynamics of closing business are not considered in this 
study. 
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Stage 3: Inclusive development measured as inequality adjusted HDI = (Y3, y3) is related to 
estimated growth from Stage 2 in addition to other variables and controls. This stage involves 
two sets of equations also, i.e., inclusive development that is influenced by the KE from starting 
business, and inclusive development from growth associated with KE from doing business. The 
theoretical basis of this stage is Equation 5 for which       
     
                     
  
   
         
 
Figure 1 summarizes the essential parts of the approach utilized. 
 
Dependent Variable    Independent Variable    Stage 
     
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
2  
 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 - Business Dynamics, Growth, and Inclusive Development in African countries.  
 
The figure suggests the following reduced form estimation specifications: 
 
                                 
 
          
                          
                     (6) 
 
           
                        
  , 
 
Where   is estimated y from the preceding stage, and   are error terms of an unknown structure a 
KE = (Y1, y1) 
• Business Dynamics =  (Z, z) 
• Controls =  (X1, x1) 
Growth = (Y2, 
y2) 
• (Y1, y1) 
• Controls  = (X2, x2) 
• Other Considerations 
Development 
= (Y3, y3) 
• (Y2, y2) 
• Controls = (X3, x3)  
• Other Considerations 
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priori, but assumed to be random. Thus, in (6)                 
                 
  
  
         as opposed to the alternatives. 
 
4. Results 
 
Tables 4-8 present estimation results by stage, and it is to those we turn next. 
 
4.1 First-stage KE-Business dynamics Nexus 
 
Table 4A reveals that overall the dynamics of starting business explains 40% to 67% of all 
variations in KE. However, the dynamics of starting business in these countries differ across KE 
dimensions, being lowest for the Creditex variable, and highest for the logSTJA = Innovex  
variable. Moreover, the dynamics of doing (operating) business explains 36% to 42% of changes 
in KE (the five KE indicators). Among these, doing business dynamics explain the Educatex 
dimension of KE the least. 
 
How strong are the instruments for starting and doing business as determinants of KE? The 
answer is in Table 4B, and it differs across the KE dimensions and the dynamics of starting and 
doing business themselves. The results show that starting business explains between 43% and 
99% of the variations in KE. On average doing business is responsible for only about 46% of 
variations in KE dimensions. Respectively, starting business dynamics are first, second, and third 
strongest explainers of Educatex, ICTex, and logSTJA indicators of KE, and weakest for 
Creditex. By contrast, the strengths of doing business on KE indicators are nearly uniform at 
about 45%. 
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Table 4:  KE from starting and doing business (First-stage) 
           
 Panel A: Instrumentation (Dependent variable: KE dynamics. Independent variables: Business dynamics). 
 KE from starting business KE from doing business 
 Educatex ICTex logSTJA Creditex Instireg Educatex ICTex Innovex Creditex Instireg 
           
Adjusted R² 0.634 0.641 0.667 0.397 0.484 0.364 0.414 0.415 0.419 0.406 
Fisher  30.060*** 49.258*** 55.634*** 12.073*** 25.190*** 4.661*** 10.82*** 10.17*** 6.235*** 10.317*** 
Observations 68 109 110 68 104 52 112 104 59 110 
Countries 17 20 20 14 19 23 32 32 20 31 
           
 Panel B: Testing the strength of instruments (Dependent variable: KE dynamics. Independent variables: 
Instrument KE dynamics) 
   
           
Instrument 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Adjusted R² 0.988 0.900 0.676 0.425 0.499 0.453 0.451 0.456 0.490 0.444 
Fisher  5821.4*** 977.3 *** 228.89*** 50.59*** 103.81*** 43.36*** 92.44*** 87.35*** 56,86*** 88,259*** 
Observations 68 109 110 68 104 52 112 104 59 110 
Countries 17 20 20 14 19 23 32 32 20 31 
           
*,**,***: significant levels at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Educatex is the first principal component of primary, secondary and tertiary school enrolments. ICTex: first principal component of mobile, 
telephone and internet subscriptions. STJA: Scientific and Technical Journal Articles. Innovex: first principal component of STJA, trademarks and patents (resident plus nonresident). VA: Voice & 
Accountability. RL: Rule of Law. R.Q: Regulation Quality. GE: Government Effectiveness. PS: Political Stability. CC: Control of Corruption. Instireg (Institutional regime): First PC of VA, PS, RQ, 
GE, RL & CC. Creditex: first principal component of private domestic credit and interest rate spread. KE: Knowledge Economy.  
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 4.2 Second-stage Growth-KE Nexus 
 
Table 5 reports the results of the estimation (Panel A) and the testing of the strength (Panel B) 
results of KE as determined by the dynamics of starting and doing business, and how these relate 
to economic growth. Average KE from starting business and average KE from doing business 
account for 81% and 80% of all fluctuations in economic growth, respectively.  In this case, 
however, specific KE from starting and doing business are high only for the Innovex = logSTJA 
dimension of KE. For others adjusted R-squares and Fisher statistics are low. Although the 
explanatory power of the regressions are low, we know for certain that the results do not mean 
that there is no relationship; there is one because average KE is responsible for up to 83% of 
variations in economic growth. We offer plausible explanation in the section on the concluding 
implications of the study. 
 
Table 6 shows the correlations among control and other variables and KE from starting business 
(Panel A) and doing business (Panel B), while Table 7 displays descriptive statistics. An 
important note from these matrices is that there are considerable positive and negative 
correlations between starting business dynamics and control variables (Panel A). High 
correlations between doing business dynamics and control variables are few (Panel B). We 
discuss expected signs and strong correlations in subsequent sections of this study. 
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Table 5:  Growth related to KE from starting and doing business (Second-stage) 
             
 Panel A: Instrumentation (Dependent variable: GDP growth. Independent variables: Instrumented KE dynamics ) 
     
 KE from starting business KE from doing business 
 Educatex ICTex Innovex Creditex Instireg KE Educatex ICTex Innovex Creditex Instireg KE 
             
Adjusted R² 0.047 0.154 0.731 0.233 0.304 0.806 0.077 0.302 0.638 0.179 0.171 0.797 
Fisher  3.337* 19.69*** 297.07*** 2.427*** 45.16*** 26.592*** 4.196** 48.09*** 180.19*** 12.653*** 22.54*** 18.13*** 
Observations 68 109 110 68 104 32 51 112 103 59 110 23 
Countries 17 20 20 14 19 10 23 32 32 20 31 13 
             
             
 Panel B: Testing the strength of instruments (Dependent variable GDP growth. Independent variables: Instrumented GDP growth) 
     
 KE from starting business KE from doing business 
 Educatex ICTex Innovex Creditex Instireg KE Educatex ICTex Innovex Creditex Instireg KE 
Instrument 1.000 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 
 (0.174) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.020) (0.020) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Adjusted R² 0.047 0.154 0.731 0.233 0.304 0.831 0.077 0.302 0.638 0.179 0.171 0.834 
Fisher  3.337* 19.69*** 297.07*** 21.42*** 45.168*** 152.65*** 4.196** 48.09*** 180.19*** 12.653*** 22.54*** 110.8*** 
Observations 68 109 110 68 104 32 51 112 103 59 110 23 
Countries 17 20 20 14 19 10 23 32 32 20 31 13 
             
*,**,***: significant levels at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Educatex is the first principal component of primary, secondary and tertiary school enrolments. ICTex: first principal component of mobile, 
telephone and internet subscriptions. STJA: Scientific and Technical Journal Articles. Innovex: first principal component of STJA, trademarks and patents (resident plus nonresident). VA: Voice & 
Accountability. RL: Rule of Law. R.Q: Regulation Quality. GE: Government Effectiveness. PS: Political Stability. CC: Control of Corruption. Instireg (Institutional regime): First PC of VA, PS, RQ, 
GE, RL & CC. Creditex: first principal component of private domestic credit and interest rate spread. KE: Knowledge Economy.  
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Table 6: Correlation matrix of Growth related to KE from business dynamics  
             
 Panel A: Growth related to KE from Starting Business  
   
Control Variables Starting Business IHDI  
NODA Inflation FDI  Priv Invt. Pub. Invt IVGrEduSB IVGrICTSB IVGrSTJASB IVGrCredSB IVGrInstSB IVGrKESB   
1.000 -0.004 0.165 -0.222 0.195 -0.749 -0.633 -0.457 0.835 -0.612 0.852 -0.072 NODA 
 1.000 0.011 -0.042 -0.072 -0.017 -0.046 0.105 0.290 -0.049 0.226 -0.009 Inflation 
  1.000 0.635 0.074 0.183 0.074 0.154 0.164 0.060 0.294 -0.042 FDI 
   1.000 -0.037 0.443 0.350 0.132 -0.302 0.336 -0.453 0.025 Priv. Invt. 
    1.000 -0.125 -0.162 0.041 0.263 -0.198 0.190 -0.151 Pub. Invt. 
     1.000 0.913 0.583 -0.972 0.859 -0.930 0.880 IVGrEduSB 
      1.000 0.331 -0.801 0.986 -0.703 0.784 IVGrICTSB 
       1.000 -0.447 0.228 -0.168 0.400 IVGrSTJASB 
        1.000 -0.735 0.864 -0.721 IVGrCredSB 
         1.000 -0.622 0.757 IVGrInstSB 
          1.000 -0.743 IVGrKESB 
           1.000 IHDI 
             
 Panel A: Growth related to KE from Doing Business  
   
Control Variables Doing Business IHDI  
NODA Inflation FDI  Priv Invt. Pub. Invt IVGrEduDB IVGrICTDB IVGrSTJADB IVGrCredDB IVGrInstDB IVGrKEDB   
1.000 -0.004 0.165 -0.222 0.195 -0.525 -0.450 -0.218 -0.340 -0.485 0.608 -0.072 NODA 
 1.000 0.011 -0.042 -0.072 -0.089 -0.208 0.042 -0.124 -0.006 0.325 -0.009 Inflation 
  1.000 0.635 0.074 0.146 0.399 -0.260 -0.106 0.100 -0.166 -0.042 FDI 
   1.000 -0.037 0.329 0.421 0.073 0.180 0.266 -0.086 0.025 Priv. Invt. 
    1.000 -0.301 -0.174 0.024 -0.105 -0.108 0.230 -0.151 Pub. Invt. 
     1.000 0.0737 0.143 0.545 0.817 -0.651 0.778 IVGrEduDB 
      1.000 0.086 0.506 0.764 -0.694 0.600 IVGrICTDB 
       1.000 0.596 0.409 0.146 0.286 IVGrSTJADB 
        1.000 0.780 -0.327 0.536 IVGrCredDB 
         1.000 -0.736 0.637 IVGrInstDB 
          1.000 -0.652 IVGrKEDB 
           1.000 IHDI 
             
NODA: Net Official Development Assistance. FDI: Foreign Direct Investment. Priv. Invt: Private Investment. Pub. Invt: Public Investment.  IVGrEduSB: Growth related to 
Education from Starting Business. IVGrICTSB: Growth related to ICT from Starting Business. IVGrSJTASB: Growth related to STJA from Starting Business. IVGrCredSB: 
Growth related to Economic Incentives from Starting Business.  IVGrInstSB: Growth related to Institutional regime from Starting Business.  IVGrKESB: Growth related to KE 
from Starting Business. IVGrEduDB: Growth related to Education from Doing Business. IVGrICTDB: Growth related to ICT from Doing Business. IVGrSJTADB: Growth 
related to STJA from Doing Business. IVGrCredDB: Growth related to Economic Incentives from Doing Business.  IVGrInstDB: Growth related to Institutional regime from 
Doing Business.  IVGrKEDB: Growth related to KE from Doing Business. IHDI: Inequality Adjusted Human Development Index.  
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Table 7: Descriptive statistics of instrumented variables (Growth related to KE from 
business dynamics) 
         
Panel A: KE from Starting Business  Panel B: KE from Doing  Business 
 Mean S.D Min Max Obs.   Mean S.D Min Max Obs. 
IVGrEduSB 0.446 1.352 -2.362 3.082 68  IVGrEduDB 0.774 1.539 -2.128 6.384 51 
IVGrICTSB 1.252 2.016 -2.512 8.353 109  IVGrICTDB 2.162 2.288 -4.566 8.130 112 
IVGrSTJASB 4.979 1.450 1.231 7.356 110  IVGrSTJADB 4.279 1.381 0.304 6.869 103 
IVGrCredSB 5.745 1.477 3.162 9.024 68  IVGrCredDB 1.460 2.052 -3.106 5.687 59 
IVGrInstSB 2.322 2.378 -1.703 11.504 104  IVGrInstDB 1.444 1.882 -3.721 5.072 110 
IVGrKESB 6.302 1.801 3.474 9.662 32  IVGrKEDB 5.327 2.181 2.057 9.485 23 
             
IVGrEduSB: Growth related to Education from Starting Business. IVGrICTSB: Growth related to ICT from Starting Business.  
IVGrSJTASB: Growth related to STJA from Starting Business. IVGrCredSB: Growth related to Economic Incentives from Starting Business.   
IVGrInstSB: Growth related to Institutional regime from Starting Business.  IVGrKESB: Growth related to KE from Starting Business.  
IVGrEduDB: Growth related to Education from Doing Business. IVGrICTDB: Growth related to ICT from Doing Business. IVGrSJTADB:  
Growth related to STJA from Doing Business. IVGrCredDB: Growth related to Economic Incentives from Doing Business.  IVGrInstDB:  
Growth related to Institutional regime from Doing Business.  IVGrKEDB: Growth related to KE from Doing Business. S.D: Standard Deviation.  
Min: Minimum. Max: Maximum. Obs: Observations.  
 
 
4.3 Third-stage: Development-Growth Nexus -- Panel Fixed Effects regression 
 
The results from the third-stage estimation are in Table 8. They associate economic growth as 
determined by KE with inclusive development measured by the IHDI. The effects on IHDI of 
growth based on KE from starting business without and with time effects (Panel A) are positive, 
except in the cases of ICTex, Creditex, and Instireg, which are negative when time effects are 
included, albeit not significant. The included variables explain up to 70% of variations when 
time effects are not considered and up to 89% when time effects are considered. Comparatively 
such effects are more important than the effects of foreign aid (NODA) which are negative 
across the board. They also  compare favorably to the effects of private investment. More on this 
later. 
 
In Panel B of Table 8 the effects on inclusive development of growth associated with KE from 
doing business without and with time effects are less impressive, and in fact negative for ICT 
without and with time effects, negative for Creditex and Innovex = STJA, and average KE with 
time effects.  Excluding time effects, growth that is influenced by KE from doing business 
explains 26% - 96%. In summary, without the time effects a one percent increase in growth 
enhanced by KE from starting business improves inclusive development by 1.3%, and only by 
half a percent when the time effects are included. Inclusive development increases by 1.1% for 
every one percent increase in growth related to KE from doing business. 
 
The key control variables have the expected signs. Asongu (2013a) has established that in the 
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African literature on inclusive growth, low and stable inflation is pro-poor. His results are 
consistent with the findings of Albanesi (2007) on the disequalizing income-distribution effect of 
high inflation on the one hand and the results of Bulir (1998) and Lopez (2004) on the equalizing 
income distribution effect of low inflation, on the other hand
10
. The negative effect of foreign 
direct investment on inclusive development is consistent with a recent study on quality of growth 
in developing countries (Mlachila et al., 2014) or IHDI in African countries (Asongu, 2014a). 
The positive effect of investment (public and private) on IHDI is consistent with intuition and the 
predictions of economic theory. Interestingly, moreover, also public investment appear to exert a 
stronger effect on inclusive development than private investment.  
                                                 
10
  It should be noted that, the mean inflation of 57.55% is largely due to Zimbabwe’s outlier, the median inflation is 
only 5.33%. As opposed to high inflation, low inflation is better for the poor because it exerts a lower depreciation 
in their purchasing power, relative to income.  
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Table 8:  Inclusive development from Growth related to KE from starting and doing business (Third stage): 
             
 Dependent variable: Inequality adjusted Human Development Index (IHDI)   
     
 Panel A: KE from starting business 
 Education  ICT STJA Economic Incentives  Institutional Regime  Knowledge Economy 
Constant  0.493*** 0.534*** 0.499*** 0.531*** 0.449*** 0.490*** 0.545*** 0.527*** 0.494*** 0.531*** 0.486*** 0.484*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
IVGrEduSB 0.012*** 0.005** --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.000) (0.013)           
IVGrICTSB --- --- 0.006** -0.0002 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
   (0.014) (0.893)         
IVGrSTJASB --- --- --- --- 0.010** 0.007*** --- --- --- --- --- --- 
     (0.046) (0.000)       
IVGrCredSB --- --- --- --- --- --- -0.004 0.003 --- --- --- --- 
       (0.442) (0.201)     
IVGrInstSB --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.005* -0.0006 --- --- 
         (0.055) (0.619)   
IVGrKESB --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.003* 0.005*** 
           (0.055) (0.003) 
NODA -0.002** -0.0008 -0.002*** -0.001** -0.002*** -0.0007** -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.003** -0.003*** 
 (0.020) (0.196) (0.000) (0.011) (0.000) (0.032) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.010) (0.000) 
Inflation  0.0007*** 0.0003*** 0.0005*** 0.0004*** 0.0006*** 0.0003*** 0.0008*** 0.0007*** 0.0006*** 0.0004*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Private Invt. --- --- 0.0004 -0.0002 0.0005 -0.0004* 0.0004* -0.0001 0.0005 -0.0002 0.0005*** 0.001*** 
   (0.190) (0.258) (0.174) (0.096) (0.087) (0.592) (0.147) (0.269) (0.002) (0.005) 
Public Invt. --- --- 0.001* 0.0005 0.001* 0.00006 0.0008** 0.0003 0.001* 0.0005 0.0009 0.001* 
   (0.065) (0.302) (0.079) (0.876) (0.035) (0.419) (0.059) (0.300) (0.216) (0.082) 
             
Time effects No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Adjusted R² 0.551 0.848 0.635 0.853 0.599 0.881 0.688 0.890 0.619 0.854 0.842 0.865 
Fisher  554.17*** 1148.7*** 720.27*** 1275.7*** 671.64*** 1618.8*** 951.26*** 1712.4*** 707.81*** 1320.6*** 785.61*** 682.19*** 
Observations 61 61 68 68 69 69 47 47 69 69 28 28 
Countries 17 17 14 14 14 14 10 10 14 14 9 9 
             
 Panel B: KE from doing business 
 Education  ICT STJA Economic Incentives  Institutional Regime  Knowledge Economy 
Constant  0.479*** 0.563*** 0.493*** 0.508*** 0.436*** 0.513*** 0.548*** 0.553*** 0.503*** 0.507*** 0.558*** 0.400*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) 
IVGrEduSB 0.004 0.003*** --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.152) (0.000)           
IVGrICTSB --- --- -0.001 -0.001 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
   (0.723) (0.376)         
IVGrSTJASB --- --- --- --- 0.008*** -0.0009 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
     (0.003) (0.334)       
IVGrCredSB --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.003** -0.0002 --- --- --- --- 
       (0.049) (0.581)     
IVGrInstSB --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.007** 0.0007 --- --- 
         (0.011) (0.541)   
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IVGrKESB --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- -0.0008 0.011** 
           (0.807) (0.058) 
NODA 0.001 -0.002** 0.0002 -0.0005*** 0.0001 -0.0005*** 0.0001 -0.0005 0.000 -0.0005*** 0.0005 -0.001 
 (0.271) (0.033) (0.600) (0.009) (0.801) (0.007) (0.866) (0.134) (0.846) (0.000) (0.290) (0.235) 
Inflation  0.0005*** 0.0001 0.0003** 0.0001* 0.0002** 0.0001** 0.0005* 0.0003* 0.0002 0.0001* 0.0009*** 0.0009** 
 (0.000) (0.139) (0.021) (0.054) (0.027) (0.039) (0.054) (0.060) (0.033) (0.068) (0.000) (0.015) 
Private Invt. 0.002*** -0.0005 0.001*** 0.000 0.0009*** 0.000 0.0008** 0.0001 0.0009*** 0.000 0.001*** 0.001* 
 (0.000) (0.178) (0.005) (0.712) (0.009) (0.707) (0.026) (0.180) (0.005) (0.740) (0.002) (0.082) 
Public Invt. 0.003*** 0.0009 0.001*** 0.0004** 0.001** 0.0005** 0.001* 0.0005** 0.001** 0.0005** 0.002** 0.003*** 
 (0.000) (0.110) (0.007) (0.028) (0.017) (0.026) (0.069) (0.016) (0.010) (0.027) (0.021) (0.008) 
             
Time effects No Yes No Yes No No No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Adjusted R² 0.446 0.937 0.255 0.856 0.333 0.857 0.496 0.878 0.344 0.858 0.930 0.964 
Fisher  301.33*** 1610.2*** 543.68*** 2238.3*** 625.27*** 2330.7*** 703.81*** 1955.1*** 636.17*** 2335.08*** 1465.2*** 1281.7*** 
Observations 37 37 71 71 73 73 41 41 73 73 21 21 
Countries 17 17 22 22 22 22 14 14 22 22 11 11 
             
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. NODA: Net Official Development Assistance. FDI: Foreign Direct Investment. Priv. Invt: Private Investment. Pub. Invt: Public 
Investment.  IVGrEduSB: Growth related to Education from Starting Business. IVGrICTSB: Growth related to ICT from Starting Business. IVGrSJTASB: Growth related to STJA from Starting 
Business. IVGrCredSB: Growth related to Economic Incentives from Starting Business.  IVGrInstSB: Growth related to Institutional regime from Starting Business.  IVGrKESB: Growth related to KE 
from Starting Business. IVGrEduDB: Growth related to Education from Doing Business. IVGrICTDB: Growth related to ICT from Doing Business. IVGrSJTADB: Growth related to STJA from Doing 
Business. IVGrCredDB: Growth related to Economic Incentives from Doing Business.  IVGrInstDB: Growth related to Institutional regime from Doing Business.  IVGrKEDB: Growth related to KE 
from Doing Business.  
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5 Concluding Implications 
 
The main purpose of this paper is study the relationships (a) between the business environment 
and KE, (b) between KE so determined and economic growth, and consequently (c) between 
economic growth and inclusive development in a number of African countries. We represent the 
business environment with the dynamics of starting and doing business in those countries. 
Economic growth is measured conventionally as the growth rate of real GDP and inclusive 
development is inequality-adjusted HDI. As indicated by the adjusted R-squares and exact F 
statistic, the explanatory power of the regression of KE on starting and doing business dynamics 
is reasonable, i.e., the effects of business dynamics on KE are both nonzero and strong. Thus, 
contrary to popular pronouncements, the African business environment may not be perfect for 
the rapid development of KE, but the results reveal that the dynamics of starting and doing 
business in these countries are certainly not hostile to KE. 
 
At the second stage of the estimation, the results indicate a weak link between the KE as 
determined in the first stage and economic growth. Both adjusted R-squares and F-statistic are 
low. One reasonable explanation is that the weakness could be due to the synergic effect from 
combined dimensions of KE enhancing growth. It should be noted that, relative to individual KE 
components, the growth-enhancing effect from KE is quite substantial. This is not new 
conjecture, because the KE literature demonstrates convincingly that, South Korea’s growth-
enhancing benefits from KE have been based on a strategy that incorporates all the dimensions 
of KE (Suh & Chen, 2007; Lee, 2009). Another plausible explanation is that the low adjusted R-
squares simply indicate missing relevant variables, which is not unreasonable given the large 
constant terms. Such an explanation is also likely because parameter signs are generally 
consistent with economic tuition and intuition. For instance, if KE is taken to be a technology, 
then its weak effect on growth is consistent with the so-called “Africa dummy” found to be either 
low or negative in growth regressions (cf. Temple, 1999; Temple & Johnson, 1998). If KE is an 
output, the results reflect the fact that in this group of countries KE is a tiny fraction of the 
general economy. Hence, whereas the econometrician purist would be troubled by the low level 
of statistical significance, we insist that the results are indicative of economic significance and 
relevance of the situation, and recommend further research. Such research could focus on the 
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possibility of specification bias (wrong functional forms), miss-specification (wrong variables 
included or correct variables excluded), or on the estimation techniques. One possible suspect of 
miss-specification in this respect is the dynamics of closing business, which we excluded from 
the regressions due to inadequate data. But even without that effort, it is the case that low 
adjusted R-squares and F-statistic are not zero, and hence the coefficients of included variables 
are not simultaneously equal zero. 
 
Regarding the third-stage estimation results, the hypotheses we set out to investigate have been 
overwhelmingly validated. For example: Education from starting and doing business is 
associated with growth, which in turn influences the quality of development (Hypothesis 1);  
ICT from starting and doing business is associated with growth which influences the quality of 
development (Hypothesis 2); Innovation from starting and doing business is associated with 
growth which influences the quality of development (Hypothesis 3); Economic incentives from 
starting and  doing business is associated with growth which influences the quality of 
development (Hypothesis 4); and Institutional regime from starting and doing business is 
associated with growth which influences the quality of development (Hypothesis 5). Obviously 
not all associations are statistically significant, but that does not bother us greatly, because, given 
the small number of observations we had to work with, we are comfortable taking a minimalistic 
approach by not placing too much emphasis on the magnitude of estimated coefficients, relative 
to their signs. We understand that the low magnitude of parameter is due to the varying degrees 
of adjusted (linearized) coefficients of determinants across various stages of the empirical 
analysis. Econometrically speaking, linearity in the parameters is not the same thing as linearity 
in the variables. Even so, a key policy conclusion one can draw from the results so far is that 
they dispute categorical statements that the African business environment is bad for inclusive 
development, worse for economic growth, and crippling (worst) for KE. In what follows below 
we stress the results in detail in respect of specific hypotheses. 
 
First, we have found that the African business environment influences the quality of education 
which logically has growth enhancing benefits that ultimately improve inclusive human 
development. This finding is consistent with the African entrepreneurship literature as it relates 
to general education. Greater business exposure – including exposure to entrepreneurial studies – 
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boosts students’ entrepreneurial acumen, sharpness, propensity, and even youth 
entrepreneurship, resulting in needed financial literacy (Singh, et. al., 2011; Gerba, 2012; 
Oseifuah, 2010; Ita et al., 2014). From that viewpoint inclusive human development is in line 
with Mensah & Benedict’s (2010) study on the positive impact of starting and doing business on 
poverty reduction. Two other related perspectives hold that the production value of knowledge 
(education), and positive human capital externalities from learning in the African continent, 
which are increasingly and strongly influenced by the positive business environment, also have 
growth-enhancing effects on inclusive human development (Amavilah, 2009; Wantchekon, et. 
al., 2014).  
 
The following policy implications are relevant to boosting the education dimension of KE: 
improving of the knowledge infrastructure, fighting brain drain, improving the nexus between 
technological science and industry, updating the academic curricula of sampled countries and 
greater support for Research & Development (R&D). These all would enable the continent to 
reap the educational benefits accruing from an increasingly vibrant business environment.  
Reinvigoration of learning should not be restricted to general formal education. In addition to 
vocational & technical training, governments should adopt lifelong learning strategies like ‘work 
place trainings’ in order to keep workers abreast with the challenges of the business 
environment. Again, this is not a realization; whereas the general economy depends on factors of 
production and the current state of technology, KE depends on technological change, which is a 
function of human capital accumulation.  
 
Second, the confirmed hypothesis on ICTs is in line with the recent literature. The ICT and 
African business have been related over the past decade. Asongu (2013b), for instance, shows 
that the positive correlation of ICT with the informal financial sector has led to substantial 
growth-enhancing benefits of inclusive development, especially in terms of mitigating poverty, 
for a previously marginalized portion of the population (Demombynes & Thegeya, 2012; 
Jonathan & Camilo, 2008; Asongu, 2015).  
 
As a policy implication, substantial investment in ICT infrastructure would go a long way toward 
improving both growth and inclusive development. While business constraints are already 
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pushing most African governments into the direction of adopting such an initiative, pro-poor 
growth investment priorities in the implementation would still be critical to overall policy 
success. Like Tchamyou (2014a), we recommend that the ICT-friendly measures be 
implemented in collaboration with other soundly integrated policies that take into account 
policies such as a policy of industrialization, a regulatory & competitive policy, and a vibrant 
computing-literacy, and numeracy policy. Since, there is already a growing consensus that 
liberalization of the ICT sector in Africa has had considerable pro-poor benefits (Asongu, 2015), 
the liberalization policy could consolidate the insights from Korea’s success story. According to 
Suh & Chen (2007), in Korea policies favoring ICTs have been motivated along three main axes: 
an industrial policy requiring sound R&D and venture capital; a ‘competitive & regulatory’ 
policy entailing privatization and market liberalization, and an ‘active policy of information’ 
requiring the setting-up of electronic governance mechanisms and building of advanced 
infrastructure.   
 
Third, the positive effect of business activities on innovation in terms of STJA provides 
interesting insights on the need to invest more in the production of scientific publications in 
African countries that is presently lagging behind that of other regions of the world. Chavula 
(2010, p. 20) has found an insignificant positive relationship between STJA and growth in 
Africa. Hence, by introducing business dynamics and inclusive development dimensions into 
Chavula’s analysis, we have provided new and clarifying insights into these interrelationships. 
STJA could be enhanced through less tight Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) regimes on 
determinants of scientific publications like software (Asongu, 2014b) that have been established 
to be pro-poor in Africa (Asongu, 2014c).  
 
As a policy implication, bold initiatives are essential to boosting science & technology in 
institutions of higher learning. This would require among others, an innovation policy that is 
consistent with Africa’s level of development, and in this sense policies favouring reverse 
engineering may be worthwhile, because the technology in the sampled countries is more 
imitative and adaptive than anything else. This line of policy recommendation is in accordance 
with the underlying factors of the East Asian Miracle (Andrés et al., 2014). However, it is still 
worth noting that, following Romer (1993) and Lewis (1955), Amavilah (2005) has added that 
36 
 
the technology that matters to long-run economic growth is not only a function of resources 
alone; it is also determined by the interactions and intra-actions among resources. For example, 
huge investments in educational (school) and/or research structures, physical or virtual, along 
with mediocre investments in teachers, students, and researchers, are likely less productive than 
small investments is both “objects” and “ideas”, to use Romer’s lingo (Amavilah, 2005). This 
perspective is consistent with Schultz’s (1981) call for ‘investment in people’, and Lucas’s 
(1993) conclusion that the Asian growth miracle was really just a man-made miracle. This is 
similar to Lewis (1955[1965]) take that “Economic growth depends on upon technological 
knowledge about things and living creatures, and also upon social knowledge about man and his 
relations with his fellowmen. The former is often emphasized in this context, but the latter is just 
as important since growth depends as much upon such matters as learning how to administer 
large scale organizations, or creating institutions which favor economizing effort, as it does 
upon breeding new seeds or learning how to build bigger dams” (p. 164, added stress).  
 
Fourth, it is natural to expect an improving business environment (like the one currently 
unfolding in Africa) to stimulate economic incentives by means of credit facilities which 
ultimately engender growth and inclusive human development. However, documented surplus 
liquidity issues severely constrain financial allocation efficiency in Africa, and the resulting 
inefficiency is not a good channel to inequality mitigation (Saxegaard, 2006; Asongu, 2013a). As 
a policy implication, capital requirements in Small & Medium Size Enterprises (SMEs) should 
be adequately addressed, because, relative to multinational companies (MNCs), pro-poor 
externalities from SMEs are likely larger than those from MNCs.  
 
Fifth, the finding related to the hypothesis on the institutional regime pillar of KE clearly 
articulates the imperative of good institutions in growth, which extends to inclusive 
development. This also supports a clarification by Amavilah et al. (2014) of Andrés et al. (2014) 
on the positive role of institutions in KE-related development when more factors are taken into 
account. Among other studies on institutions, Oluwatobi et al. (2014) have recently established 
that government effectiveness and regulation quality are the most relevant for growth enhancing 
innovations. Again, this is in line with the critical dimension of institutions for the emergence of 
Africa stressed in Fosu (2013ab) and Musila & Sigue ( 2010, 2011), and inclusive development 
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discussed by Mlachila et al. (2014). Improvement of the institutional regime component should 
be in conjunction with other economic policies already discussed. 
 
Sixth, we will be remiss if we did not point out that incidental to the main purpose of this study, 
the results also reveal other interesting insights as well as important implications associated with 
the control and other variables of the study. Among these foreign aid (proxied by NODA) is 
inversely related to inclusive development. Such a result is familiar to the aid-growth debate and 
we stay away from that debate in this paper, except mention that foreign aid to many African 
countries has often been crisis-driven as the current effort on Ebola in three West African 
countries demonstrates. More the most part, such aid has been helpful only insofar as it might 
keep the recent alive, but less effective in promoting growth, least reducing poverty – obviously 
a normative statement on our part. 
 
In addition to foreign aid, and inflation discussed already, the net effects on inclusive 
development of investment are positive. However, it turns out private investment is generally 
less effective as a means of promoting inclusive development than public investment. In fact, 
while the effects of public investment on inclusive development are positive, those of private 
investment are negative, especially with respect to ICT, STJA, Creditex and Instireg. It would 
seem reasonable to conclude that public policy in these African countries overstresses foreign aid 
and FDI even though greater benefits lie in supporting the local business environment. Having 
said a mouthful, we pause to admit that this paper does not offer definitive answers, but it does 
indeed provide enough fodder for further research, and a firm foundation for improving 
policymaking in this group of countries. How demonstrable this analysis to policy in other 
countries represents future research opportunities.   
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